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Abstract
With the emergence of cyber-attacks on control systems it has become clear that improving the security of control systems is
an important task in today’s society. We investigate how an attacker that has access to the measurements transmitted from
the plant to the controller can perfectly estimate the internal state of the controller. This attack on sensitive information of
the control loop is, on the one hand, a violation of the privacy, and, on the other hand, a violation of the security of the closed-
loop system if the obtained estimate is used in a larger attack scheme. Current literature on sensor attacks often assumes that
the attacker has already access to the controller’s state. However, this is not always possible. We derive conditions for when
the attacker is able to perfectly estimate the controller’s state. These conditions show that if the controller has unstable poles
a perfect estimate of the controller state is not possible. Moreover, we propose a defence mechanisms to render the attack
infeasible. This defence is based on adding uncertainty to the controller dynamics. We also discuss why an unstable controller
is only a good defence for certain plants. Finally, simulations with a three-tank system verify our results.
Key words: Cyber-physical security; Privacy; Linear control systems; Kalman filters; Algebraic Riccati equations;
Discrete-time systems.
1 Introduction
The smart grid and intelligent transportation systems
are two prime examples of cyber-physical systems,
where physical processes are controlled over communi-
cation networks and with digital computers. The inter-
connection of the physical and cyber domain promises
great advantages in the performance and capabilities of
cyber-physical systems. However, with the introduction
of communication networks and computational devices,
the controlled processes become vulnerable to cyber-
attacks. Documented cyber-attacks such as the Stuxnet
attack on an Iranian uranium enrichment facility (Kush-
ner, 2013), the cyber attack on a German steel mill (Lee
et al., 2014) or the BlackEnergy attack on the Ukrainian
power grid (Lee et al., 2016) show that these attacks are
not a futuristic concept but already happening.
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Teixeira et al. (2015) define a cyber-physical attack space
that is spanned by the attacker’s disclosure and disrup-
tive resources as well as its model knowledge. Disclo-
sure resources enable the attacker to gather information
about the system and therefore break its confidentiality.
These disclosure attacks can, for example, be used to
increase the attacker’s model knowledge. Disruptive re-
sources, on the other hand, let the attacker launch both
deception and denial of service attacks, which affect the
integrity and the availability of measurement and actua-
tor signals, respectively. Several attacks can be mapped
into this attack space, for example replay attacks, where
well-behaved sensor measurements are replayed, while
the actuator signals are changed.
Although many attack strategies have been investigated,
the analysis of sensor attacks has gained popularity in
the last decade. A goal of the sensor attacks is to re-
main undetected by the anomaly detector of the oper-
ator, while changing the measurements. Figure 1 shows
the block diagram of the cyber-physical system under
a sensor attack. Here, the dashed line going to the at-
tacker corresponds to the disclosure resources of the at-
tacker. The disclosure resources can be used to gather
more information about the closed-loop system, for ex-
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Fig. 1. Block diagram of the closed-loop system equipped
with an anomaly detector under a sensor attack
ample, about the internal states of the plant x(k), the
controller xc(k), or the anomaly detector xD(k). The
disruptive resources are denoted by ya(k) and are used
to change the values of the measurements from y(k) to
y˜(k) = y(k) + ya(k). Mo and Sinopoli (2010) look into
integrity attacks on sensors and define a notion of per-
fectly attackable systems, while Ca´rdenas et al. (2011)
analyse two different detectors and three sensor attack
strategies. Another approach is to maximize the error
covariance matrix of a state estimator with a sensor at-
tack as it is done in Guo et al. (2018). In Murguia and
Ruths (2016), a sensor attack strategy is proposed which
replaces the residual signal r(k), which is the input to
the anomaly detector (Fig. 1), with a signal designed by
the attacker. This attack strategy is then used to look
at the impact under the two anomaly detectors investi-
gated in Ca´rdenas et al. (2011). In Umsonst and Sand-
berg (2019), it was shown how an attacker using this at-
tack strategy is able to break the confidentiality of the
internal anomaly detector state xD(k).
What connects all these papers on sensor attacks is that
the attacker needs to have exact knowledge about the
internal state xc(k) of the controller, when the attack
starts. Mo and Sinopoli (2010) assume that the initial
system state is zero in order to determine the unde-
tectable attack, while the other papers assume that the
controller state is known to the attacker. Therefore, this
paper investigates a missing piece that is often taken for
granted in sensor attacks, namely the broken confiden-
tiality of the controller’s internal state. More precisely,
we examine if an attacker with full model knowledge lis-
tening to the sensor measurements is able to break the
confidentiality of the controller. This confidentiality at-
tack can have two purposes. One purpose might be that
the attacker is curious and wants to follow the activ-
ity the control center. The other purpose might be that
it is one step in a more complex attack scheme. This
step represents gathering information of the plant and
its controller, which is then used in later steps to attack
the system. We can interpret this as a first step the at-
tacker needs to perform to execute the attacks proposed
by the papers mentioned above.
1.1 Contributions
The contribution of our work is three-fold. Firstly, we
provide a rigorous analysis of whether or not an attacker
with full-model knowledge and access to all sensors is
able to perfectly estimate the internal state of the output-
feedback controller. Although it may seem obvious that
such a powerful attacker is able to estimate the state
perfectly, we show that if the operator uses an unstable
controller the attacker is not able to do so. We further
classify all gains for a linear time-invariant observer the
attacker could use to achieve a perfect estimate in case of
a stable output-feedback controller. The second contri-
bution provides a defence mechanisms against this dis-
closure attack. This mechanism proposes to add some
uncertainty to the controller’s input, which can be in-
terpreted as a watermarking scheme. Furthermore, we
discuss when an unstable controller is an appropriate
defence mechanism. The third contribution is the veri-
fication of our theoretical results with simulations of a
three-tank system under attack.
1.2 Related work
Most of the research on the security of cyber-physical
systems has focused on the integrity and availability of
data, according to Lun et al. (2019). For example, all
the previously mentioned papers on sensor attacks ex-
cept Umsonst and Sandberg (2019) consider integrity
attacks.
Other work on the confidentiality of control systems can
be found in, for example, Xue et al. (2014), Yuan and
Mo (2015), and Dibaji et al. (2018). What distinguishes
this paper from these results is that we focus on a gen-
eral linear system structure, while Xue et al. (2014) in-
vestigate the confidentiality of a special structured lin-
ear system. Further, we focus on the confidentiality of
the controller’s internal state. However, Xue et al. (2014)
consider the confidentiality of the whole system state,
while Dibaji et al. (2018) look into the confidentiality of
controller gains and in Yuan and Mo (2015) the attacker
wants to identify the controller structure. In Yuan and
Mo (2015), it is shown that an appropriate controller de-
sign can lead to confidentiality. We also show that a cer-
tain type of controller, in our case an unstable controller,
leads to confidentiality regarding sensitive information
of the controller. It is interesting that an appropriate
controller design can preserve the controller’s confiden-
tiality.
Another recent research direction is to use homomor-
phic encryption to ensure the security and privacy of
control systems (Kogiso and Fujita, 2015; Farokhi et al.,
2017). Based on encrypted sensor measurements the con-
troller determines an encrypted control signal, which is
decrypted at the actuator, i.e. the feedback loop oper-
ates on encrypted signals. The use of encrypted signals
guarantees that, even if the attacker estimates the con-
troller state, the estimate is not useful to the attacker,
due to the encryption. In our approach, we use an ar-
tificial uncertainty instead of encryption techniques to
preserve the confidentiality of the controller.
Defending the cyber-physical system against attacks by
introducing an artificial uncertainty is also done in the
work using watermarking. Watermarking of the actua-
tor signal has been considered as a defence mechanism,
for example, against replay attacks (Mo et al., 2015) or
sensors attacks in networked control systems (Hespanhol
et al., 2018). However, in this paper, the uncertainty is
added to the input of the controller, while watermarking
techniques usually add it to the output of the controller,
i.e. the actuator signal.
1.3 Notation
Let x be a vector in Rn and A a matrix in Rn×m. The
spectral radius of a quadratic matrix A is ρ(A). Fur-
ther, we say A is (Schur) stable, if ρ(A) < 1. By B > 0
(B ≥ 0), we mean a matrix is symmetric positive defi-
nite (semi-definite). The identity matrix of dimension n
is denoted as In, while 0 denotes either a scalar, a vector,
or a matrix with all elements equal to zero. The dimen-
sion of 0 is clear from the context. A Gaussian random
variable x with mean µ and covariance matrix Σ is de-
noted as x ∼ N (µ,Σ).
2 Problem formulation
In this section, we present the models of the plant and
controller. Further, we describe the assumptions on and
goals of the attacker, which set the stage for the formu-
lation of the problem.
2.1 Plant and controller model
The plant is modelled as a linear discrete-time system,
x(k + 1) = Ax(k) +Bu(k) + w(k),
y(k) = Cx(k) + v(k),
(1)
where x(k) is the state of the plant in Rnx , u(k) is
the plant input in Rnu , and y(k) is the measured out-
put in Rny . Further, A ∈ Rnx×nx is the system matrix,
B ∈ Rnx×nu is the input matrix, and C ∈ Rny×nx is the
output matrix. Here, w(k) ∼ N (0,Σw) is the process
noise and v(k) ∼ N (0,Σv) is the measurement noise,
where Σw ≥ 0 and Σv > 0 are the covariance matrices
of the respective noise terms and have appropriate di-
mensions. The noise processes w(k) and v(k) are each
independent and mutually uncorrelated. The operator
uses an output-feedback controller of the form
xc(k + 1) = Acxc(k) +Bcy(k),
u(k) = Ccxc(k) +Dcy(k),
(2)
where xc(k) is the controller’s state in Rnc , Ac ∈ Rnc×nc
is the system matrix of the controller, Bc ∈ Rnc×ny is
the input matrix of the controller, Cc ∈ Rnu×nc is the
output matrix of the controller, and Dc ∈ Rnu×ny is the
feedthrough matrix from the measurements to the actua-
tor signal. This structure can represent many commonly
used controllers. For example, with Ac = A−BK−LC,
Bc = L, Cc = −K, and Dc = 0, we obtain an observer-
based controller, where xc(k) is an estimate of x(k), and
K and L represent the feedback and observer gain, re-
spectively. The observer-based controller is, for example,
used in Murguia and Ruths (2016).
The closed-loop system dynamics can be written as
[
x(k + 1)
xc(k + 1)
]
=
[
A+BDcC BCc
BcC Ac
][
x(k)
xc(k)
]
+
[
w(k) +BDcv(k)
Bcv(k)
]
.
Introducing
z(k) =
[
x(k)
xc(k)
]
and η′(k) =
[
w(k) +BDcv(k)
Bcv(k)
]
we write the closed-loop system as
z(k + 1) = A′zz(k) + η
′(k)
y(k) = Czz(k) + v(k) =
[
C 0
]
z(k) + v(k),
(3)
where η′(k) ∼ N (0, Q′) is the zero mean process
noise of the closed-loop system with covariance matrix
Q′ ∈ R(nx+nc)×(nx+nc) and v(k) is the measurement
noise.
Assumption 1 The system is such that
(1) (A,B) is stabilizable,
(2) (C,A) is detectable,
(3) (A,Σ
1
2
w) has no uncontrollable modes on the unit
circle, and
(4) the controller (Ac, Bc, Cc, Dc) is minimal.
The stability of A′z depends on the controller matri-
ces Ac, Bc, Cc, and Dc. Therefore, we need the first two
points of Assumption 1 such that the operator is able to
observe and control all unstable modes in the system.
The third point is needed later for the existence of the
solution of a Riccati equation. To avoid unnecessary dy-
namics, the implementation of the controller should be
its minimal realization.
Assumption 2 The operator has designed Ac, Bc, Cc,
and Dc, such that the closed-loop system is stable, i.e.
ρ(A′z) < 1.
Assuming a stable closed-loop system is in line with nor-
mal operator requirements.
Assumption 3 The closed-loop system has reached
steady state before k = 0 and z(0) ∼ N (0,Σ0), where
Σ0 ≥ 0 is the solution to
Σ0 = A
′
zΣ0(A
′
z)
T +Q′.
This assumption is not restrictive, since industrial plants
usually run for long periods of time, and we know that
the covariance of z(k) will reach its unique steady state,
since ρ(A′z) < 1 by Assumption 2.
Note that the closed-loop process noise variable η′(k) is
correlated with the measurement noise v(k),
E
{[
η′(k)
v(k)
] [
η′(k)T v(k)T
]}
=

Σw +BDcΣvD
T
c B
T BDcΣvB
T
c BDcΣv
BcΣvD
T
c B
T BcΣvB
T
c BcΣv
ΣvB
TDTc Σ
T
v B
T
c Σv

=
 Q′ S
ST R
 ,
where S ∈ R(nx+nc)×ny , and R ∈ Rny×ny .
Since the η′(k) and v(k) are correlated, we will apply a
transformation proposed in Chan et al. (1984) to obtain
a system representation with uncorrelated noises.
z(k + 1) = A′zz(k) + η
′(k)− SR−1(y(k)− y(k))
= Azz(k) + η(k) + SR
−1y(k),
where Az = A
′
z − SR−1Cz,
η(k) = η′(k)− SR−1v(k) =
[
w(k)
0
]
,
E
{[
η(k)
v(k)
] [
η(k)T v(k)T
]}
=
Q 0
0 R
 ,
and
Q = Q′ − SR−1ST =
[
Σw 0
0 0
]
.
The zero elements in Q show us that there is no process
noise acting on the controller in the transformed system.
Therefore, the closed-loop dynamics we consider from
now on are
z(k + 1) = Azz(k) + η(k) + SR
−1y(k),
y(k) = Czz(k) + v(k).
(4)
Note that even though ρ(A′z) < 1, it is not always the
case that ρ(Az) < 1.
2.2 Attack model and goals
Now that we introduced the plant and controller model,
we look into the attack model and the attacker’s goal.
We begin by introducing the assumptions made for the
attacker.
Assumption 4 The attacker has gained access to
the model (A,B,C,Ac, Bc, Cc, Dc), the noise statistics
(Σw,Σv), the measurements y(k) for k ≥ 0 but not the
control signals u(k) and the initial state of the system
z(0).
Since the manipulation of control signals can lead to
an immediate physical impact, we assume u(k) is bet-
ter protected and therefore the attacker does not have
access to it. Moreover, we set the start of the attack ar-
bitrarily to k = 0. This can be interpreted as the point
in time, from which the attacker has access to the mea-
surements. From Assumption 3 we know that the plant
and controller have been running for a long time. There-
fore, the attacker does not know the state z(0) when it
gains access to the sensor measurements.
Assumption 5 The attacker uses measurements up to
time step k to estimate the controller’s internal state at
time step k + 1.
It is possible to use measurements up to time step
k∗ ≥ k + 1 to estimate the controller’s state at time step
k + 1. However, if the attacker wants to launch a false-
data injection attack at time step k + 1, this estimate
needs to be available already.
The goal of the attacker is to obtain an estimate xˆc(k),
such that this estimate perfectly tracks the controller
state xc(k) as k grows large. This can be either a first
step in a larger attack scheme or a way to gain some
insight in the controller’s internal state. The goal can be
formulated as the following problem.
Problem 1 Estimate xc(k) such that the estimation er-
ror is unbiased, i.e. E{xc(k) − xˆc(k)} = 0, and its co-
variance matrix Σc(k) approaches zero, i.e.
lim
k→∞
Σc(k) = 0
for a given Σc(0) ≥ 0.
An estimation error covariance matrix Σc(k) that ap-
proaches zero as k grows large means the estimate con-
verges to the true value in mean square (and thus also
in probability).
In Section 3 we characterize for which systems the con-
troller’s confidentially can be broken (Problem 1), and
in Section 4 we discuss possible defence mechanisms.
3 Estimating the controller’s state xc(k)
In this section, we investigate when a solution to Prob-
lem 1 exists. It may seem obvious that an attacker ac-
cording to Assumption 4 is without any doubt able to
estimate the controller’s state xc(k) perfectly. However,
we show in the following that this is not always the case.
First, we present the optimal attack strategy to estimate
xc(k) and then state conditions for the convergence of
Σc(k) to zero. Following this, we look into non-optimal
strategies to solve Problem 1.
3.1 Optimal attack strategy
To obtain the optimal attack strategy, we start by in-
vestigating the conditional probability of the closed-loop
system state z(k+ 1) given all measurements up to time
step k. Due to the presence of the process noise, η(k), and
measurement noise, v(k), we know that z(k+1) is a ran-
dom variable. Since (4) is a linear system with Gaussian
noise, we know that z(k+1) given the measurements up
to time step k is also a Gaussian random variable (An-
derson and Moore, 1979). Let {y(i)}li=0 be the sequence{y(0), · · · , y(l)}, then the conditional probability distri-
bution of z(k + 1) given {y(i)}ki=0 is
z(k + 1|{y(i)}ki=0) ∼ N
(
zˆ(k + 1),Σz(k + 1)
)
,
where
zˆ(k + 1) = Az zˆ(k) + SR
−1y(k) + Lz(k)
(
y(k)− Cz zˆ(k)
)
(5)
is the conditional mean of z(k + 1) with Lz(k) =(
AzΣz(k)C
T
z
)(
CzΣz(k)C
T
z +R
)−1
, zˆ(0) = E{z(0)} = 0,
and
Σz(k + 1) = AzΣz(k)A
T
z +Q
− (AzΣz(k)CTz )(CzΣz(k)CTz +R)−1(AzΣz(k)CTz )T
(6)
is the conditional covariance matrix. Its initial condition
is Σz(0) = Σ0, which is given in Assumption 3.
The optimal estimator for z(k) given {y(i)}ki=0 is the
Kalman filter (Anderson and Moore, 1979). It is optimal
in the sense that it minimizes the mean square error.
Therefore, the optimal attack strategy to estimate xc(k)
is a time-varying Kalman filter, which uses zˆ(k) in (5) as
the estimate of z(k). The goal of the attacker is to have
an estimate zˆ(k) of the closed-loop system’s state such
that
[
0 Inx
]
zˆ(k)→ xc(k) as k →∞.
Instead of directly analysing zˆ(k), we introduce the esti-
mation error ez(k) = z(k)− zˆ(k) that has the dynamics
ez(k + 1) =
(
Az − Lz(k)Cz
)
ez(k) + η(k) + Lz(k)v(k).
and covariance matrix
E{ez(k + 1)ez(k + 1)T |{y(i)}ki=0
}
= Σz(k + 1).
A Kalman filter is an unbiased estimator, which
means that E{z(k)} = zˆ(k), or, differently formu-
lated, E{ez(k)} = 0. Hence, Problem 1 is solved if, for
Σz(0) = Σ0, the attacker’s Kalman filter fulfils
lim
k→∞
Σz(k) =
[
P 0
0 0
]
, (7)
where P ≥ 0. Note that Σ0 can be calculated by the at-
tacker because of its model knowledge by Assumption 4.
3.2 Asymptotic convergence to Σc(k) = 0
Let us now investigate when the optimal attack strat-
egy solves Problem 1. Here, we present necessary and
sufficient conditions for the covariance matrix Σc(k) to
converge to zero. Recall this is equivalent to saying that
(7) is fulfilled.
Before we present our convergence results, note that a
steady state solution to (6) satisfies the algebraic Riccati
equation (ARE)
Σ∞ = AzΣ∞ATz +Q
− (AzΣ∞CTz )(CzΣ∞CTz +R)−1(AzΣ∞CTz )T , (8)
whereL∞ =
(
AzΣ∞CTz
)(
CzΣ∞CTz +R
)−1
is the steady
state Kalman gain.
Definition 1 (Definition 3.1 (Chan et al., 1984))
A real symmetric nonnegative definite solution Σ∞ to
(8) is called a strong solution if ρ(Az − L∞Cz) ≤ 1.
The strong solution is called a stabilizing solution if
ρ(Az − L∞Cz) < 1.
The following lemma from de Souza et al. (1986) will be
useful in the following discussion.
Lemma 1 (Theorem 3.2 (de Souza et al., 1986))
Let GTG = Q,
(1) the strong solution of the ARE exists and is unique
if and only if (Cz, Az) is detectable;
(2) the strong solution is the only nonnegative definite
solution of the ARE if and only (Cz, Az) is detectable
and (Az, G) has no uncontrollable modes outside the
unit circle;
(3) the strong solution coincides with the stabilizing
solution if and only if (Cz, Az) is detectable and
(Az, G) has no uncontrollable modes on the unit
circle;
(4) the stabilizing solution is positive definite if and only
if (Cz, Az) is detectable and (Az, G) has no uncon-
trollable modes inside, or on the unit circle.
Let us begin by showing that a solution to (8) of the
form in (7) exists.
Proposition 1 A solution of the algebraic Riccati equa-
tion (8) is given by
Σ∞ =
[
P 0
0 0
]
,
where P ≥ 0 is the unique solution of the ARE
P = APAT + Σw −APCT (CPCT + Σv)−1CPAT .
PROOF. Let us first determine
Az = A
′
z − SR−1Cz =
[
A BCc
0 Ac
]
.
After algebraic computations we obtain
AzΣ∞ATz +Q =
[
APAT + Σw 0
0 0
]
, AzΣ∞CTz =
[
APCT
0
]
,
and CzΣ∞CTz +R = CPC
T + Σv such that(
AzΣ∞CTz
)(
CzΣ∞CTz +R
)−1(
AzΣ∞CTz
)T
=[
APCT (CPCT + Σv)
−1CPAT 0
0 0
]
.
This leads to
Σ∞ =
[
APAT + Σw −APCT (CPCT + Σv)−1CPAT 0
0 0
]
.
For Σ∞ to be a solution of (8) we require
P = APAT + Σw −APCT (CPCT + Σv)−1CPAT .
(9)
Note that (9) by itself is an algebraic Riccati equation.
It is actually the algebraic Riccati equation an opera-
tor would obtain when it is designing a time-invariant
Kalman filter. Due to detectability of (C,A) (Assump-
tion 1), there exists a unique strong solution P ≥ 0 for
(9) (Lemma 1). Hence, Σ∞ is a solution of (8).
Now that we proved that Σ∞ is indeed a solution to
the algebraic Riccati equation, we need to show under
which conditions Σz(k) converges to Σ∞ for the initial
condition Σ0.
Lemma 2 The unique strong solution of the ARE (8)
is Σ∞ if and only if ρ(Ac) ≤ 1.
PROOF. Due to the first statement in Lemma 1, the
strong solution is unique and exists if and only if (Cz, Az)
is detectable. From the stability of A′z = Az + SR
−1Cz,
it follows that (Cz, Az) is detectable. Hence, the strong
solution will be unique. Further, if ρ(Az−L∞Cz) ≤ 1 for
L∞ =
(
AzΣ∞CTz
)(
CzΣ∞CTz +R
)−1
=
[
APCT (CPCT + Σv)
−1
0
]
=
[
L¯
0
]
,
then Σ∞ is a strong solution. Let us now look at the
eigenvalues of Az −L∞Cz, which are determined by the
eigenvalues of A− L¯C and Ac, because
Az − L∞Cz =
[
A− L¯C BCc
0 Ac
]
.
Due to the detectability of (C,A) (Assumption 1), the
first statement of Lemma 1 shows us that P is a strong
solution of (9), such that ρ(A − L¯C) ≤ 1. Therefore,
ρ(Az−L∞Cz) ≤ 1, i.e. Σ∞ is the unique strong solution,
if and only if ρ(Ac) ≤ 1.
Theorem 1 The covariance matrix Σz(k) converges to
the attacker’s desired covariance matrix Σ∞ for the ini-
tial condition Σ0, if and only if ρ(Ac) ≤ 1.
PROOF. By Lemma 2, Σ∞ is the unique strong solu-
tion of (8) if and only if ρ(Ac) ≤ 1. Theorem 4.2 in de
Souza et al. (1986) states that subject to Σ0 − Σ∞ ≥ 0
the covariance matrix Σz(k) will converge to the strong
solution Σ∞ if and only if (Cz, Az) is detectable. That
(Cz, Az) is detectable is shown in the proof of Lemma 2.
Let us now show that Σ0−Σ∞ ≥ 0. If we use the system
representation with correlated noise processes (3), the
ARE for Σ∞, according to Anderson and Moore (1979),
is
Σ∞ = A′zΣ∞(A
′
z)
T +Q′
−(A′zΣ∞CTz +S)(CzΣ∞CTz +R)−1(A′zΣ∞CTz +S)T .
(10)
Subtracting (10) from the Lyapunov equation for Σ0 in
Assumption 3 leads to
Σ0 − Σ∞ = A′z
(
Σ0 − Σ∞
)
(A′z)
T
+(A′zΣ∞C
T
z +S)(CzΣ∞C
T
z +R)
−1(A′zΣ∞C
T
z +S)
T .
This is also a Lyapunov equation with a unique solution
since ρ(A′z) < 1 (Assumption 2). Further, we observe
that
(A′zΣ∞C
T
z + S)(CzΣ∞C
T
z +R)
−1(A′zΣ∞C
T
z + S)
T ≥ 0,
because Σ∞ ≥ 0. Therefore, we know that Σ0−Σ∞ ≥ 0.
Hence, with initial condition Σ0
lim
k→∞
Σz(k) = Σ∞
if and only if ρ(Ac) ≤ 1.
Corollary 1 Problem 1 is solvable if and only if
ρ(Ac) ≤ 1.
Note that since the attacker uses a Kalman filter, it does
not only obtain a perfect estimate of xc(k) but also an
optimal estimate of x(k).
Theorem 1 shows that the covariance matrix converges
to the attacker’s desired strong solution, but not how fast
the convergence is. Therefore, we will now investigate
the conditions for an exponential convergence rate.
Proposition 2 Subject to Σ0 > 0, the covariance ma-
trix Σz(k) converges exponentially fast to Σ∞ if and only
if ρ(Ac) < 1.
PROOF. Theorem 4.1 in de Souza et al. (1986) shows
us that subject to Σ0 > 0 the covariance matrix Σz(k)
converges exponentially fast to the stabilizing solution if
and only if (Cz, Az) is detectable and (Az, G) has no un-
controllable modes on the unit circle. We already showed
that (Cz, Az) is detectable, therefore we look at the con-
trollable modes of (Az, G) now. Recall that GG
T = Q
such that
G =
[
Σ
1
2
w 0
0 0
]
.
For (Az, G) to have no uncontrollable modes on the unit
circle we need Ac to have no eigenvalues on the unit cir-
cle, because we cannot control the eigenvalues ofAc with
G, and due to Assumption 1 (A,Σ
1
2
w) has no uncontrol-
lable modes on the unit circle. We showed in Lemma 2
that Σ∞ is a strong solution to the ARE if and only
if ρ(Ac) ≤ 1. Hence, subject to Σ0 > 0 the covariance
matrix Σz(k) converges exponentially fast to Σ∞ if and
only if ρ(Ac) < 1.
This shows us that if Σ0 > 0 and the operator uses a
stable controller, i.e. ρ(Ac) < 1, the covariance matrix of
the attacker’s time-varying Kalman filter will converge
exponentially fast to Σ∞. Hence, the attacker is able to
obtain a perfect estimate of xc(k) exponentially fast.
3.3 Breaking confidentiality of xc(k) using non-optimal
observers
Previously, we have shown under which conditions the
attacker is able to get a perfect estimate of the con-
troller state xc(k) when a time-varying Kalman filter
is used. The time-varying Kalman filter is the optimal
filter for linear systems with Gaussian noise. One may
wonder whether or not the attacker is able to perfectly
estimate xc(k), when the attacker uses a non-optimal
observer. Here, we investigate a time-invariant observer
of the form
zˆ(k + 1) = Az zˆ(k) + SR
−1y(k) + Lz
(
y(k)− Cz zˆ(k)
)
,
(11)
with zˆ(0) = 0, where Lz is the attacker’s constant ob-
server gain. As before, instead of looking at zˆ(k), we
analyse the error dynamics given by
ez(k + 1) =
(
Az − LzCz
)
ez(k) + η(k) + Lzv(k).
with E{ez(k)} = 0 for all k ≥ 0, covariance matrix
E{ez(k)ez(k)T |{y(i)}k−1i=0
}
= Σz(k) and Σz(0) ≥ 0.
The following theorem classifies all gains Lz of a non-
optimal observer such that Problem 1 is solved.
Theorem 2 For any Σz(0) ≥ 0,
lim
k→∞
Σz(k) = Σ˜∞ =
[
P˜ 0
0 0
]
,
if and only if ρ(Ac) < 1,Lz = [L
T
1 0
T ]T andL1 ∈ Rnx×ny
is chosen such that ρ(A−L1C) < 1. Here, P˜ is the unique
solution to
P˜ = (A− L1C)P˜ (A− L1C)T + Σw + L1ΣvLT1 ,
and P˜ − P ≥ 0, where P is the unique solution to (9).
PROOF. With Lz = [L
T
1 L
T
2 ]
T the error dynamics are
ez(k + 1) =
[
A− L1C BCc
−L2C Ac
]
ez(k) +
[
w(k)− L1v(k)
L2v(k)
]
.
The error covariance matrix evolves as
Σz(k + 1) = (Az − LzCz)Σz(k)(Az − LzCz)T
+
[
Σw + L1ΣvL
T
1 L1ΣvL
T
2
L2ΣvL
T
1 L2ΣvL
T
2
]
. (12)
Now we show that Σ˜∞ is the steady state solution of (12)
if and only if L2 = 0. First, we observe that if L2 = 0
then Σ˜∞ is a steady state solution of (12), where P˜ is
the solution to the Lyapunov equation
P˜ = (A− L1C)P˜ (A− L1C)T + Σw + L1ΣvLT1 .
Note that P˜ ≥ 0 exists and is unique if ρ(A− L1C) < 1.
Second, if Σ˜∞ is a steady state solution of (12) the equa-
tions
P˜ = (A− L1C)P˜ (A− L1C)T + Σw + L1ΣvLT1 ,
0 = L2(ΣvL
T
1 − CP˜ (A− L1C)T ), and
0 = L2(CP˜C
T + Σv)L
T
2
are fulfilled. The last equation is only fulfilled if L2 = 0,
since Σv is positive definite. This simultaneously ful-
fils the second equation. The first equation recovers the
Lyapunov equation for P˜ . Therefore, if Σ˜∞ is a steady
state solution of (12) then L2 = 0. Hence, (12) has Σ˜∞
as a steady state solution if and only if L2 = 0. Let
us now look at the convergence of (12) to Σ˜∞. For any
Σz(0) ≥ 0, the error covariance matrix converges to Σ˜∞
if and only if ρ(Az − LzCz) < 1. With L2 = 0, the sta-
bility of Az − LzCz is guaranteed when both ρ(Ac) < 1
and ρ(A − L1C) < 1. Due to detectability of (C,A) in
Assumption 1 such a stabilizing L1 exists. Therefore,
(12) converges to Σ˜∞ for any Σz(0) ≥ 0, if and only
if L2 = 0, ρ(A − L1C) < 1, and ρ(Ac) < 1. Further,
ρ(Az − LzCz) < 1 also makes Σ˜∞ the unique steady
state solution of (12). Since the Kalman filter is the best
linear estimator, we know that P˜ − P ≥ 0 and P˜ = P
if L1 = APC
T (CPCT + Σv)
−1 (Anderson and Moore,
1979). This choice of L1 turns the Lyapunov equation of
P˜ into (9).
Theorem 2 shows us that the attacker is able to use the
non-optimal observer (11) solve to Problem 1, if and only
if the controller is stable.
Corollary 2 Problem 1 is solvable with a non-optimal
observer of the form (11) if and only if ρ(Ac) < 1.
According to Theorem 2, the attacker does not need to
know the noise statistics Σw and Σv for the design of
L1 to estimate xc(k) perfectly, as long as L1 is stabiliz-
ing. Hence, the attacker’s required knowledge to solve
Problem 1 is reduced when the operator uses a stable
controller. Further, the attacker has a smaller computa-
tional burden when a time-invariant observer is used.
4 Defence mechanisms
We presented under which conditions Problem 1 is
solvable both with optimal and non-optimal strate-
gies. Therefore, we investigate now how to prevent the
attacker from estimating xc(k), i.e. make Problem 1
unsolvable. We present a defence mechanisms and dis-
cuss why an unstable controller is only in certain cases
a good defence mechanism.
4.1 Injecting noise on the controller side
As previously shown, an attacker under Assumption 4
will be able to predict the controller state perfectly for
ρ(Ac) ≤ 1. We observe that the controller dynamics in
(2) contain no uncertainty for the attacker when y(k) is
known. Therefore, an approach for defence is to intro-
duce uncertainty in the form of an additional noise term
on the controller side.
The additional noise term ν(k) has a zero mean Gaus-
sian distribution with a positive semi-definite covariance
matrix Σν ∈ Rnc×nc . Further, ν(k) is independent and
identically distributed over time and also independent
of w(k), v(k), and z(0). The controller state with the
additional noise term follows the dynamics
xc(k + 1) = Acxc(k) +Bcy(k) + ν(k).
Here, ν(k) can be interpreted as process noise of the
controller.
This changes the process noise of the closed-loop sys-
tem (4) from η(k) to η˜(k) = [w(k)T ν(k)T ]T such that
E
{[
η˜(k)
v(k)
] [
η˜(k)T v(k)T
]}
=

Σw 0 0
0 Σν 0
0 0 Σv
 =
 Q˜ 0
0 R
 .
The following proposition shows that with ν(k), the at-
tacker’s desired covariance matrix Σ∞ is not a steady
state solution of (8) any more.
Proposition 3 The algebraic Riccati equation (8) with
Q = Q˜ does not have Σ∞ as a steady state solution.
PROOF. With Σz(k) = Σ∞ and Q = Q˜ we obtain
AzΣ∞ATz + Q˜ =
[
APAT + Σw 0
0 Σν
]
,
and using this in the Riccati equation (8) leads to
Σ∞ =
[
APAT + Σw −APCT (CPCT + Σv)−1CPAT 0
0 Σν
]
.
For Σ∞ to be a solution of (8) we need both
P = APAT + Σw −APCT (CPCT + Σv)−1CPAT ,
which, as shown previously, exists, and Σν = 0.
Since we assume Σν 6= 0, Σ∞ is not a solution of (8) any
more.
Here, we see that the attacker will not be able to perfectly
estimate the controller’s state if we use this additional
noise on the controller side even if the attacker knows
the noise properties.
Remark 1 The approach of adding some additional
noise to the system is quite similar to the watermarking
approach used, for example, in Mo et al. (2015). The
difference is that here the noise is added to the con-
troller input, while in watermarking the noise is typically
added to the output of the controller. Therefore, these
results show that if we position the watermarking noise
at a different position we get the additional benefit of
the attacker not being able to estimate the state of the
controller perfectly.
4.2 An unstable controller as defence
As shown before, Problem 1 is not solvable if and
only if ρ(Ac) > 1. Hence, designing the controller
(Ac, Bc, Cc, Dc) such that ρ(A
′
z) < 1 and ρ(Ac) > 1
leads to a successful defence against the discussed dis-
closure attack.
This implies that there are plants which have an inher-
ent protection against the sensor attack. For example,
all plants that are not strongly stabilizable, i.e. plants
that cannot be stabilized with a stable controller (Doyle
et al., 2013), have an inherent protection against the es-
timation of the controller’s state by the attacker. Fur-
ther, there are also control strategies that give an inher-
ent protection to the closed-loop system. Disturbance
accommodation control (Johnson, 1971), where the con-
troller tries to estimate a persistent disturbance, is one
example of these control strategies.
If a plant can be stabilized by using a stable controller,
i.e. a strongly stabilizing plant, using an unstable con-
troller instead comes with several issues. A fundamental
limitation is that the integral of the log sensitivity func-
tion is zero for a stable open-loop system. If the open-
loop system has unstable poles the integral is equal to
a constant positive value that depends on the unstable
poles of the open-loop system and their directions for
a multivariable discrete-time system (Chen and Nett,
1995). As Stein (2003) shows with real world examples,
it can have dire consequences if this fundamental limi-
tation is not taking into account properly. Hence, due to
these fundamental limitation the introduction of unsta-
ble poles in the controller is not desirable. Another is-
sue of unstable controllers is that an unstable controller
leads to an unstable open-loop system, if the feedback
loop is interrupted.
Therefore, using an unstable controller for a strongly sta-
bilizing plant is not recommended, but is an appropriate
defense mechanism if an unstable controller is needed to
stabilize the plant.
5 Simulations
In this section, we verify our results with simulations for
a three tank system. After stating the model of the three
tank system, we first show the effect of stable and un-
stable controllers on the attacker’s estimate of the con-
troller’s state. Later, we verify that the additional noise
prevents the attacker from estimating the controller’s
state perfectly.
5.1 The three tank system
For the simulation of the closed-loop system estimation
by the attacker we look at the following continuous-time
three tank system
x˙(t) =

−2 2 0
2 −4 2
0 2 −3
x(t) +

0.5 0
0 0
0 0.5
u(t) + w(t),
y(t) =
[
0 1 0
0 0 1
]
x(t) + v(t).
By discretizing the continuous-time system with a sam-
pling period of Ts = 0.5 s we obtain A, B, and C. We
assume that w(k) ∼ N (0, I3) and v(k) ∼ N (0, 0.1I2).
5.2 Stable and unstable controllers
Now that the system matrices are defined we are going
to verify that the controller’s stability influences the es-
timates of the controller’s state by the attacker. We con-
sider an observer-based feedback controller
xc(k + 1) = (A−BKi − LC)xc(k) + Ly(k)
u(k) = −Kixc(k)
where L is the observer gain and Ki is the controller
gain. The closed-loop system matrix is then
A′z,i =
[
A −BKi
LC A−BKi − LC
]
.
According to Assumption 2, ρ(A′z,i) < 1, which means
that Ki and L are designed such that ρ(A − BKi) < 1
and ρ(A − LC) < 1. The matrix L is designed via pole
placement to place the eigenvalues of A−LC at 0.1, 0.2,
and 0.3. Therefore, the error dynamics of the observer
used in the controller are stable. In the following, we
design three different Ki such that ρ(A−BKi) < 1.
The first controller KS places the poles of A− BKS at
0.4, 0.5, and 0.6. This first controller results in stable
controller dynamics A−BKS −LC with ρ(A−BKS −
LC) = 0.4167.
The second controller,KU , is unstable, i.e. ρ(A−BKU−
LC) > 1, but has no modes on the unit circle. We deter-
mineKU , such that ρ(A−BKU ) < 1 andA−BKU−LC
has an eigenvalue at 1.5. The controller we obtain is
KU =
[
0.5530 1.9589 1.2225
1.8414 27.0785 −12.9349
]
and it places the eigenvalues of A − BKU − LC at 1.5,
−0.5175, and −0.1066 and the eigenvalues of A−BKU
at 0.6275, 0.4272 + j0.6456, and 0.4272− j0.6456.
For the design of the third controller, KI , we place two
eigenvalues inside the unit circle and one at 1, such that
ρ(A − BKI − LC) = 1, while guaranteeing that ρ(A −
BKI) < 1. We obtain
KI =
[
3.0988 −6.0472 2.3966
4.0471 10.8175 −4.4516
]
,
which places the eigenvalues of A − BKI − LC at 1,
−0.2227, and −0.3693 and the eigenvalues of A − BKI
at −0.2669, 0.6405 + j0.5942, and 0.6405− j0.5942.
For the first two controllers, the attacker designs a time-
invariant Kalman filter with gain Liz and steady state
error covariance matrix Σi∞ = limk→∞Σ
i(k), where
i ∈ {S,U}. The attacker’s time-invariant Kalman filter
design leads to an observer gain LSz for the closed-loop
system, which matches our results in Theorem 2. Since
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Fig. 2. Comparison of the estimation error trajectories for
the stable and unstable controller, KS and KU respectively
KU leads to an unstable controller, we know according
to Corollary 2 that no time-invariant observer exists that
solves Problem 1. Further, Corollary 1 shows that even
if the attacker would use a time-varying Kalman filter,
Problem 1 is not solvable.
For the closed-loop system with KI , the attacker needs
to use a time-varying Kalman filter to obtain a perfect
estimate of xc(k). The error covariance matrix in this
case will converge to the same as in the case with KS .
Now that we designed the Kalman filters for each of the
three closed-loop systems, let us look at the estimation
error ez(k) = z(k) − zˆ(k) ∈ R6. Here, we are only in-
terest in the last three elements of ez(k), because they
represent the estimation error of the controller state.
The jth element of ez(k) is denoted by ez,j(k), where
j ∈ {1, · · · , 6}. Figure 2 shows that in case of a stable
controller KS the estimation error converges quickly to
zero and the attacker obtains a perfect estimate of the
controller’s state. However, if we use an unstable con-
troller KU the estimation error remains noisy and the
attacker is not able to obtain a perfect estimate of the
controller’s state. Furthermore, when KI is used, we
observe that the estimation error converges to zero, but
is still not zero after a million time steps (see Figure 3).
Theorem 1 only tells us that the error will converge, but
we know it does not converge exponentially by Proposi-
tion 2. Although the attacker can obtain an almost per-
fect estimate with the time-varying Kalman filter after
a million time steps, it is still not a perfect estimate.
This shows us that a controller with modes on the unit
circle can prevent the attacker from quickly obtaining a
perfect estimate.
5.3 Injecting process noise for the controller
Now that we showed how the controller design affects
the attacker’s estimate of the controller’s state, we ver-
ify that injecting noise to the input of the controller pre-
vents the attacker from estimating xc(k) perfectly. The
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Fig. 3. Estimation error of the controller’s state when the
controller has a pole on the unit circle and the attacker uses
a time-varying Kalman filter
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Fig. 4. The effect of the additional noise on the estimation
error of the controller’s state when a stable controller is used
additional noise ν(k) has a covariance of Σν = 0.01I3.
Since the attacker has full model knowledge, we assume
that the attacker knows Σν and designs its observer ap-
propriately.
Figure 4 shows the trajectory of the estimation error
of the controller’s state in this case, when the opera-
tor uses the stable controller KS and the attacker uses
again a time-invariant Kalman filter. Compared to Fig-
ure 2, the estimation error exhibits noisy behaviour and
the attacker is not able to obtain a perfect estimate even
though we use the stable controller KS . Hence, the ad-
ditional noise prevents the attacker from estimating the
controller’s state perfectly.
6 Conclusion and future work
We have shown exactly when an attacker with full model
knowledge is able to perfectly estimate the internal state
of an output-feedback controller by observing all mea-
surements.
Although it seems obvious that an attacker according
to our attack model can always estimate the controller’s
state, we gave necessary and sufficient conditions when
an attacker is not able to obtain a perfect estimate.
These conditions state that unstable controller dynam-
ics prevent the attacker from obtaining a perfect esti-
mate. Further, the attacker can use a non-optimal time-
invariant observer to perfectly estimate the controller
state if and only if the controller has stable dynamics.
A defence mechanisms has been proposed to make the
controller states confidential. This mechanism prevents
the attacker from obtaining a perfect estimate by adding
uncertainty to the controller dynamics. This is similar
to watermarking approaches proposed by other authors
with the twist that the noise signal is applied to the
controller input and not to its output. An unstable con-
troller gives an inherent protection to plants that are
not strongly stabilizable. However, designing such a con-
troller introduces fundamental limitations on the sensi-
tivity function of the closed-loop system and should only
be used when an unstable controller is needed to stabi-
lize the plant.
There are several directions of future work. It seems ob-
vious that if the attacker has only access to a few sensors
measurements, it will not be able to estimate the con-
troller’s state. However, it is interesting to investigate
what happens if the attacker has access to some sensor
and some actuator signals, and how many of each the at-
tacker needs to get a perfect estimate of the controller’s
state. Another research direction is to investigate the ro-
bustness of the controller state estimation for cases when
the attacker has less model knowledge.
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